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Abstract
In Germany, the electoral success of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is one of the most
obvious signs of the rise of the far right. In public debates this tends to be associated with Eastern
Germany and rural regions. What is neglected is the fact that the party was also remarkably suc-
cessful in less privileged urban districts across Germany. In this paper I focus on the urban condi-
tions for the rise of the far right. I do so by presenting first results of ethnographic research in
two neighbourhoods of Frankfurt am Main. Both – Riederwald and Nied – are marginalised and
the AfD gained considerable support there in the 2017 general elections. In the accounts given in
14 expert interviews I identify three crucial urban processes: austerity urbanism, post-democracy
and gentrification. Relating them to findings of long-term studies on right-wing attitudes as well as
to the concept of ‘downward mobility’, I argue that these processes increase the competition for
resources and strengthen feelings of being left behind as well as experiences of being abandoned
by political representatives – which are driving forces for the rise of the far right. And yet these
experiences alone do not provide sufficient reason to explain the rise of the far right. They are
general processes in the neighbourhoods. However, it seems that intersections with existing
group-focused enmities drive a shift from social to regressive collectivity, which raises the potential
for far-right political subjectification.
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Introduction
Nationalist, racist and authoritarian parties
and movements are gaining ground world-
wide. In Germany, besides right-wing mass
demonstrations and a growing prevalence of
far-right hate crime and violence (BMI,
2019), the electoral success of the Alternative
for Germany (Alternative fu¨r Deutschland)
(AfD) party is the most obvious sign of this
development. Because of the electoral geo-
graphy of the AfD and the geographies of
hate crime, in public debates the rise of the
far right in Germany is mostly associated
with Eastern Germany and rural regions (cf.
Bernet et al., 2019: 13; Fo¨rtner et al., 2019).
In the general elections of 2017, for example,
the party scored roughly 20% in East
German states (but 27% in Saxony), and
even achieved results of almost 40% in some
smaller towns and rural regions. However,
the party made gains in every electoral dis-
trict, including around 10% in each West
German state. What is often neglected in
studying the AfD’s success is that the party
also gained relatively strong support in less
privileged urban districts (Bernet et al.
2019). In this paper I focus on the latter and
discuss urban conditions for the rise of the
far right, for three reasons.
First, following Hall (2006), it is in less
privileged urban neighbourhoods that –
owing to urban processes of simultaneity
and encounter as well as capitalist accumula-
tion crises – political conflicts and struggles
over culture and identity are articulated with
full force (cf. Fo¨rtner et al., 2019: 38f). In
these settings, spatial patterns can be found
which – not exclusively but definitely – aid
the rise of the far right. Second, despite the
first argument, in German urban studies
efforts have only recently been undertaken
to understand the rise of the far right in its
interdependence with urban life (cf. Bernet
et al., 2019; Bu¨rk, 2012; Fo¨rtner et al., 2019;
Grau and Heitmeyer, 2013; Podesta, 2018;
U¨blacker and Lukas, 2019). Third, critical
urban theorists, including myself, have long
emphasised the emancipatory potential of
urban subjectification and everyday life (cf.
Harvey, 2012; Lefebvre, 1968; Mayer, 2009;
Mullis, 2014, 2017). Today we have to
assume that urban experiences may also sup-
port regressive political manifestations – not
only in the form of revanchist policies
(Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008) but also
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at the level of political subjectification
processes.
In this paper I will present first results of
ongoing ethnographic research in two neigh-
bourhoods of Frankfurt am Main:
Riederwald and Nied. Both are marginalised
according to statistics and the AfD was
rather successful there in the 2017 general
elections. The empirical basis of the argu-
ment consists of 14 expert interviews with
local politicians, religious leaders and social
workers. In the interviews I focused on
social conflicts, experiences of crisis, the
quality of local infrastructure and the
unfolding political dynamics in the neigh-
bourhoods. What became evident during the
analysis of the accounts in a qualitative
mapping process (Clarke, 2005: 86–109) is
the importance of urban processes, espe-
cially austerity urbanism, post-democracy
and gentrification. The aim of this paper is
therefore to engage with the accounts and to
relate them to debates on the rise of the far
right. For the latter I rely on Nachtwey’s
(2016) arguments on ‘downward mobility’ as
well as on Heitmeyer’s (2018) analysis of
far-right attitudes in society. The empirical
scope of the argument is limited: this is due
to the small number of interviews and the
scarcity of similar research with which to
engage. Therefore, I do not claim to give
final answers. Rather, I aim to support an
emerging debate with empirically grounded
reflections and explorative hypotheses.
In the following I will first provide a brief
introduction on the rise of the AfD, findings
of research on far-right attitudes and the
concept of ‘downward mobility’. Second, I
will reflect on the present developments in
the two selected neighbourhoods. And third,
I will relate my findings to debates on the
rise of the far right in order to trace the
urban conditions. I will conclude with the
hypothesis that we are witnessing a shift
from social to regressive collectivity in
German society (and beyond).
The rise of the AfD, downward
mobility and right-wing attitudes
The AfD was founded in 2013, in the midst
of the European debt crisis, as a conservative
neoliberal and ‘eurosceptic’ party (Weiß,
2017: 83). In the course of the so-called refu-
gee crisis of 2015, the party increasingly
focused on immigration and national iden-
tity. This development did not curtail the
party’s potential; on the contrary, in the
2013 federal election the AfD received 4.7%
of the vote and remained below the 5%
threshold required to enter parliament. Four
years later, the party won 12.6% of the votes
and became the third force behind the con-
servative CDU/CSU (32.9%) and the social
democratic SPD (20.5%) parties. In election
polls in August 2019, the AfD achieved
14.5%, the CDU/CSU dropped to 27.5%
relative to the general election of 2017
(25.4%) and the SPD to 12% (28.5%). The
major beneficiary was the Green Party,
which increased its share from 8.9% in 2017
to 23.5%.
Historically, right-wing parties have occa-
sionally been successful in West Germany:
in the 1960s, the National Democratic Party
of Germany (NPD) achieved results around
8% in elections at the state level. In the
1990s, again below the federal level, The
Republicans (REP) achieved results around
10%. In both cases the success was
explained by economic crisis, a general feel-
ing of uncertainty and, especially in the
1990s, also by widespread attitudes against
immigration (Jaschke, 1993). These factors
are resurfacing in today’s analyses of
the electoral successes of the AfD (cf.
Geiselberger, 2017; Heitmeyer, 2018).
However, in contrast to the aforementioned
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cases, the AfD managed to enter the federal
parliament, every single state parliament as
well as the European Parliament – and the
party is consolidating.
Commentators agree that we are witnes-
sing a ‘Great Regression’ which ‘may be the
product of a collaboration between the risks
of globalisation and neoliberalism’
(Geiselberger, 2017: xiv). What is empirically
evident, though, is, as Hilmer et al. (2017:
12, own translation) show, that far-right
attitudes are strongly related to ‘subjective
experiences’ of being ‘slighted’ and ‘losing
control’ (cf. for similar results Franz et al.,
2018; Richter and Bo¨sch, 2017; Vehrkamp
and Wegschaider, 2017). These feelings do
not necessarily lead to the success of the far
right, but they often do (cf. Decker and
Bra¨hler, 2018; Heitmeyer, 2018; Zick et al.,
2019). The debate on the fundamental rea-
son unfolds between two poles: on the one
hand, it is argued that growing economic
insecurity and social deprivation fuel popu-
lar resentment against elites and migrants
among those left behind. On the other hand,
it is argued that we are witnessing a cultural
backlash which turns against the normative
grounds of multicultural society as well as
gender equality and laments a perceived loss
of national identity (Inglehart and Norris,
2016: 2f). In this paper I focus on the argu-
ment of Nachtwey (2016) as well as
Heitmeyer (2018), both of whom argue, by
and large, in terms of economic insecurity.
But I agree with Bernet et al. (2019: 12f) that
a strict division of the positions is not help-
ful for understanding the rise of the far right
and that rather, arguments from both ends
of the spectrum have to be taken into
account and studied with a view to their
interdependencies.
As already indicated, far-right attitudes
have been latent in post-war Germany.
Long-term studies launched in the early
2000s show that group-focused enmities and
authoritarian and anti-democratic thought
are well-rooted amidst East and West
German society (‘Leipziger Mitte-Studien’
[Leipzig Centre Studies], conducted bien-
nially since 2002, from 2018 on ‘Leipziger
Autoritarismus-Studie’ [Leipzig Study on
Authoritarianism] by a team headed by
Decker; ‘Deutsche Zusta¨nde’ [The German
State of Affairs] between 2002 and 2011
under Heitmeyer). Recent results indicate
that 24.1% (East: 30.9%/West: 22.3%) of
the population share deeply hostile attitudes
toward foreigners (Decker and Bra¨hler,
2018: 83).
For the past 15 years, two main trends
can be summarised: on the one hand,
German society has altogether become more
tolerant and liberal-minded towards diverse
lifestyles (Decker and Bra¨hler, 2018: 135–
151). On the other hand, group-focused
enmities towards Muslims, Roma and Sinti,
refugees as well as the long-term unem-
ployed are on the rise (Zick et al., 2019: 79–
84). Heitmeyer (2002) used the term ‘group-
focused enmity’ to describe ideologies of
inequality that are less linked to the concept
and terminology of race in the German con-
text than in the Anglo-Saxon world (Meyer,
2017: 15–17). ‘Group-focused enmity’ is a
term that combines cultural, class and racial
prejudices with claims to privileges that are
derived from the assumption that some peo-
ple are more entitled to – because they are
more established at – certain places than
others.
Regarding the reasons for the increase of
far-right political representations, Heitmeyer
(2018: 197) focuses on three dimensions:
increasing pressure from a competitive and
globalised ‘authoritarian capitalism’, pro-
cesses of social disintegration and shrinking
space for democratic participation.
Together, these circumstances are prone to
cause fragmentation, social division, indivi-
dualisation, isolation and a general feeling
of being abandoned. Authoritarian and far-
right political solutions can be interpreted as
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attempts to get back control of one’s own
life as well as of national society.
Nachtwey’s (2016) concept of downward
mobility, which he develops following
debates on the precarisation of contempo-
rary labour, places Heitmeyer’s research in a
wider context and, at the same time, pro-
vides an explanation for the growing feelings
of uncertainty. Analysing recent develop-
ments in Germany, Nachtwey (2016:
Chapters 3 and 4) describes a societal change
which he sees at work in all advanced capi-
talist societies: Collective upward mobility
and social integration used to be the domi-
nant pattern of social modernity (post-war
Fordism), although the associated processes
were always also selective. By contrast, in
the age of regressive modernity (neoliberal-
ism), socio-economic downward mobility
and polarisation dominate. Nachtwey sug-
gests that this results in fears of social exclu-
sion and feelings of vulnerability being
universalised:
Individually downward mobility or social
decline have not become a mass phenomenon
yet, nor is it impossible to climb up the social
ladder. Collectively though, downward mobi-
lity for ordinary workers is a fact, and social
inequality between the rich and the poor is
growing. (Nachtwey, 2016: 127, own
translation)
Nachtwey and Heitmeyer develop their
arguments foremost regarding economic
transitions. However, further research
reveals (cf. Charim, 2018; Eribon, 2013;
Gest, 2016; Hark and Villa, 2017; Inglehart
and Norris, 2016; Lengfeld, 2018;
McGarvey, 2017) that feelings of losing con-
trol, loss of identity and experiences of
downward mobility intersect with gender,
immigration and political participation. To
illustrate this: experiences of downward
mobility reflect more than losing a certain
economic position. They also include males
feeling diminished in the course of growing
gender equality, white people experiencing
that they are a race ‘among others and no
longer supreme’, etc. It is therefore not suffi-
cient to focus just on economic positions.
Still, it is important to acknowledge that the
processes of intersection (Meyer, 2017)
unfold in modern capitalist societies, which
are class-divided and unequal societies, and
that far-right patterns, even if they can
emerge in all of society, are not equally dis-
tributed in society (Heitmeyer, 2018: 131,
144). Lower classes are not per se the place
where right-wing attitudes arise, but the
exposure to economic worries, pluralisation,
the shift of gender relations and the disman-
tling of the welfare state is much higher than
in wealthier classes, which increases the
probability.
Tales of two neighbourhoods
I will now turn to two neighbourhoods of
Frankfurt where the AfD succeeded in the
2017 federal elections and which, as I will
show below, are marginalised according to
statistical data: Riederwald and Nied. I will
focus here on the accounts given in the 14
expert interviews (seven in each neighbour-
hood). I will highlight perceived changes in
the social composition of the neighbour-
hoods, current conflicts and tensions as well
as modes of political engagement.
But first I shall introduce some informa-
tion on Frankfurt. In the post-war era, the
city has steadily gained significance as a
financial centre, and since the late 1980s it
has held the status of Global City. Frankfurt
is proud of its cultural diversity (Rodatz,
2014). This was not always the case: as the
proportion of foreigners rose from 4.6% in
1961 to 22.1% in 1981, conservative politi-
cians called for zero-immigration policies
(Schacht, 1986: 143). This never gained a
majority; in 2017, 29.5% of Frankfurt’s
742,000 inhabitants were not German citi-
zens (one of the highest proportions in any
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German city), and 46.5% of these were citi-
zens of other European Union (EU) member
states.
From the 1960s to the 1980s, left-wing
extra-parliamentary politics had a strong-
hold in the city. But also, more recently
Frankfurt was the site of the largest anti-
austerity protests held in Germany between
2012 and 2015 (Mullis et al., 2016). Anti-
racist as well as tenant movements are con-
stantly present in the city. Financially,
Frankfurt prospered even after the global
financial crisis of 2007/2008, but by 2017 the
city budget had run a deficit and cuts were
expected. Socio-economically, Frankfurt is
strongly segregated (vom Berge et al., 2014):
unlike in other large cities such as Munich,
Hamburg or Cologne, average available
incomes are below the federal average and
poverty and wealth are in close proximity
(Stadt Frankfurt, 2018a, 2018b).
In the 2017 federal elections, the AfD
won 8.6% of the votes in Frankfurt, signifi-
cantly below the party’s countrywide score
of 12.6%. Nevertheless, in several neigh-
bourhoods which are mostly marginalised
according to statistics the AfD gained signif-
icant support (see Figure 1). Goerres et al.
(2018) argue that the AfD’s current strong-
holds correlate with those of earlier right-
Figure 1. AfD support in Frankfurt am Main: Federal elections 2017.
Source: Elke Alban.
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wing parties. This is also true for Frankfurt,
where in the municipal elections of 1968
the NPD won 5.8%, scoring up to 17.4%
of the vote in some working-class districts
(Gunzert, 1969: 28f). In 1993, The
Republicans won 9.3% in Frankfurt:
Riederwald (13.1%) was a stronghold, but
the party also performed well in Nied
(10.8%) (Stadt Frankfurt, 1993: 45f).
In the 2017 federal elections in
Riederwald (4849 residents), the AfD won
13.1% of the vote, and in Nied (19,788 resi-
dents) 14.2%. The Riederwald constituen-
cies are split in two. In the west of the
neighbourhood, the SPD obtained 28.1%
and the party The Left 20.3%, while the
AfD received ‘only’ 10.6%, whereas in the
eastern part of the district, the AfD won
17.5%, the SPD 24.8% and The Left 18.8%.
The highest of the AfD’s results in Nied’s
nine highly fragmented constituencies was
17.3%.
Both neighbourhoods have traditionally
been working-class, and they are marked by
the city’s de-industrialisation and the struc-
tural changes of the last 45 years (Keil and
Lieser, 1992; Ronneberger and Keil, 1995).
In Riederwald 21.3% and in Nied 17.6% of
the inhabitants rely on basic social security
provision, whereas in Frankfurt the average
is 12.8% (Stadt Frankfurt, 2019). The popu-
lations of both Riederwald and Nied are
somewhat older than average, and over one-
third of Nied and over one-quarter of
Riederwald residents are not German
citizens. In 2017, voter turnout was 67.8%
in Riederwald and 68.7% in Nied – in
Frankfurt overall 74.8%.
Even today, Riederwald is still referred to
as the ‘Red Riederwald’. In the 1920s com-
munists and social democrats had a strong-
hold in the neighbourhood. After the war
and the end of fascism the SPD dominated
again. Over time, however, the social demo-
crats lost support. In the 1972 municipal
elections, the party won 67.4% (citywide:
50.1%), and even in 1981, when the SPD
only received 34% at the national level, it
still scored 53.9% in Riederwald (Schacht,
1986: 37, 71f). The social democrats lost dra-
matically in 2017 and won only 29.6%,
down by 11.2% from 2013. As for Nied, it
was historically split between the SPD and
the CDU (Schacht, 1986: 54–57). In the
2017 federal elections, the CDU secured
26.7%, dropping 8.7% from its 2013 result,
but was ahead of the SPD’s 24.5%, down by
6.2%. Besides the AfD, the centre-right lib-
erals (FDP) and The Left made gains in
both neighbourhoods.
The transformation of social milieus
According to the interviewees, until a few
decades ago both Riederwald and Nied were
experienced as more homogeneous than they
are today. Male residents worked for the
main local industrial employers. Migration
had already been an issue between the wars,
although this mostly concerned the influx of
‘foreigners from other federal states’ (Nied, 3
August 2017) such as from catholic Bavaria,
which was frowned upon by the protestant
majority. The confessional aspect of the
‘immigration’ did not result in major con-
flicts, but it remained an aspect of societal
division that is still present today. Both
neighbourhoods were described as formerly
being like villages, where everybody knew
each other and shared everyday patterns.
After 1955, an influx of ‘guest workers’ from
southern Europe began to change the local
composition of the population.
In the last three decades, however, neolib-
eral structural changes, an exclusionary
urban development and migration have cre-
ated fault lines. One interlocutor (Nied, 25
October 2017) argues that people have
become isolated and alone, which reduces
solidarity among the citizens. Another infor-
mant (Riederwald, 12 July 2017) stresses
that peoples’ everyday struggles have
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become more difficult and that most people
feel they are alone with their worries related
to private life, such as family issues, money
troubles, alcohol or drug abuse, as well as
with the loss of employment. Additionally,
especially in Nied, a growing fear of crime
committed by foreigners is articulated; and
anger about abandoned piles of waste.
People, it is said, now tend to live by them-
selves. Rather than sharing the routines of
one industrial employer, residents now work
for a variety of employers under very dissim-
ilar conditions. This restricts the time avail-
able for family and collectivity:
I remember a young couple. They lived
together but saw each other at best 6 hours a
week, because he went to work when she came
from university, and she was asleep or already
gone again when he came home. This loss of
family time due to ever more diverging work-
ing hours and ever longer ways to work is a
general phenomenon. Some years ago, people
would have started a revolution, but today the
economy demands and everybody obeys.
(Nied, 25 October 2017)
Clear barriers of language, class – which
materialises in the division of housing estates
– and religion – especially regarding
Muslims – are said to exist. Concerning the
presence of the far right, it is highlighted
that of course there are individuals known
for their attitudes but the AfD has no active
presence, and in general their voters are
absent from public life: ‘There is no AfD
here’ (Nied, 8 August 2017).
As regards community life, both
Riederwald and Nied appear well off, but
the active groups are small and face limits:
there are all sorts of clubs and associations,
sometimes tenant organisations and, espe-
cially in Riederwald, a local democracy com-
mittee. But ‘we have problems reaching
poor people and migrants’ summed up
one interlocutor in Riederwald (18 July
2017). Civil society engagement seems to be
a middle-class ‘German’ thing, as one
interviewee put it (Riederwald, 25 October
2017). Interlocutors from both Riederwald
and Nied report with some resignation that
there is in fact no lack of democratic com-
mitment, but that it is either just not heard,
or dismissed. People seem alienated from
democratic politics and lethargic (Nied, 17
July 2017). One interlocutor in Nied relates
this to very concrete experiences:
There has been this initiative, with the goal to
revive the central street and square of Nied.
They really tried hard but they ended up get-
ting a bloody nose. The city of Frankfurt
would not listen at all, they just don’t care
about the people here. (Nied, 17 July 2017)
Similar stories of feeling neglected by city
politics are told in Riederwald using the
examples of current attempts to stop the
construction of a highway or of attempts to
stop the demolition of the neighbourhood’s
People’s House at the end of the 1990s or of
the municipal library’s closing down in the
2000s.
Little investment in infrastructure
Interlocutors in both neighbourhoods
deplored the run-down state of rental apart-
ments, the lack of retail shops and pubs, the
scruffy urban landscape and reduced social
offers. For Riederwald the situation was
described as follows:
One by one all the shops have shut down.
They were all small retail stores, a grocery, a
dairy, a bakery or whatever, but they could
not compete with the supermarkets and big
suppliers. In Riederwald this has certainly
been exacerbated by the fact that people
do not have much money and are
restricted to cheap offers. (Riederwald, 18
July 2017)
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‘In Frankfurt one can have the feeling that
the neighbourhoods outside of the centre are
being left behind’ another interlocutor
phrased it (Riederwald, 6 July 2017). By con-
trast, ‘the centre is being developed, be it
with the construction of museums, the recon-
struction of the old town, the beautification
of the central railway station or the construc-
tion of luxurious high-rises’ (Riederwald, 6
July 2017).
Nied used to be typified by company flats
constructed for the German railway and
postal service and the adjacent chemical
plant, which not only provided housing but
also supported the district’s social infrastruc-
ture, festivals and associations. Around the
turn of the century, privatisation commodi-
fied the housing stock and the corporations
reduced their social engagement – two
changes that are still deplored by the inter-
viewees. Although Nied has grown, there
has been no investment in its infrastructure
for years: ‘Nied has just gone steadily down-
hill’ (Nied, 17 July 2017). In Riederwald,
where the decline of the SPD is felt, as the
party used to be an important door opener
to the city council and played an important
role in collective life, nowadays ‘going
downhill’ is foremost related to the scruffy
urban landscape and political abandonment
(Riederwald, 19 July 2017).
An issue that bothers residents and that
was raised in almost all interviews is the lack
of public space and community centres that
enable social encounters. In reality this topic
concerns many major issues: it is viewed as
one sign of public disinvestment, because
these places used to exist; the decisions to
shut them down are associated with an
unwillingness of the city council to listen to
the demands of the local people; and the
absence of such places is, at the same time,
considered a reason for the residents’ grow-
ing isolation. It was highlighted that ‘places
are needed where people can meet infor-
mally and exchange ideas’ (Nied, 20 July
2017), or places where social contacts can
develop so that ‘more can come about’
(Riederwald, 13 July 2017).
The case of the People’s House in
Riederwald is exemplary. The building was
reconstructed after the Second World War
and inaugurated in 1963. Despite public pro-
test, the city-owned company sold it to an
investor in 1998, who demolished it the fol-
lowing year. According to an interlocutor
who had witnessed the inauguration, this
was a great loss. The house had been a place
of public life, community and encounters in
the centre of the neighbourhood
(Riederwald, 1 August 2017). To compen-
sate for the loss of public space, the city
council promised not to close the public
library. Nevertheless, this was also closed as
a result of centralising processes in 2011
(Riederwald, 6 July 2017), thus eliminating
both the easy access to books and a space
‘where people could meet’ (Riederwald, 12
July 2017). Given the previous ‘deal’, the
closing down of the library further damaged
the trust people had in the municipal
government.
Exclusionary urban development
For years, people with average and even low
incomes moved to Riederwald and Nied.
Some interviewees in Nied criticised the con-
stant influx of economically less privileged
tenants, which (had) sometimes caused ten-
sion, whereas interviewees in Riederwald
rather mentioned growing fears of being
displaced.
Interviewees in Nied criticised the city
council for a social housing policy that seg-
regated people with low incomes: ‘You can’t
say, ‘‘Just move there’’ – and lump all the
deprived people together’ (Nied, 8 August
2017). However, when read between the
lines, ‘all the deprived people’ refers to poor
migrants: in 2016, the announcement that
refugee accommodation was going to be
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built in the neighbourhood stimulated xeno-
phobic and racist protests. However, my
interlocutors stressed that the protests never
gained any momentum and were, in the end,
sidelined by an active ‘welcoming culture’.
But it still seems to be an issue in the neigh-
bourhood that refugees are catered for with
cheap housing while poor Germans have to
wait to be assigned an apartment: ‘In the
context of the current situation with the asy-
lum seekers, I hear people saying ‘‘They get
their flat paid, and we get nothing.’’ Of
course, such things play a role here’ (Nied, 8
August 2017).
In Riederwald, the urban development
dynamic is different and the neighbourhood
is, rather, confronted with incipient displace-
ment. Already today, and despite the fact
that investment in the existing housing stock
is lagging behind, people sometimes live ‘in
groups of six in two-room apartments’ to
afford the rent (Riederwald, 12 July 2017).
Recently, however, modernisation has com-
menced, with smaller units merged to create
larger apartments, leading to rent hikes of
more than 70%. One interviewee said, ‘The
residents of Riederwald are being shut out’
(Riederwald, 12 July 2017).
Fear about one’s own living situation is
cited as a significant explanation for the
AfD’s strong showing in Riederwald. Two
types of housing tenure mark the district:
one half belongs to a cooperative and the
other half is owned by a profit-oriented
public-housing company. In the first area,
where renovations of the housing stock were
carried out in a socially acceptable manner,
the SPD and The Left remained strong, and
the community of residents seems to be
lively. In the latter, where residential units
have been modernised, smaller flats merged
to create bigger ones and rents increased, the
AfD scored 17.5% in the 2017 federal elec-
tions. Many of my interlocutors attributed
this to the residents’ fear of being displaced
as well as a feeling of growing competition
over affordable housing in the course of
immigration: ‘I have no other explanation.’
The AfD’s strong showing ‘must be due to
uncertainty over housing because there is no
other big difference in the statistical data’
(Riederwald, 6 July 2017).
Urban processes and
authoritarian regression
After providing an introduction to the
accounts given in the interviews on the
dynamics that unfold in the two neighbour-
hoods, I will now trace possible interrela-
tions of the urban experience with the rise of
the far right. To that end, in a first step I
relate the findings from Riederwald and
Nied to relevant debates in urban studies: in
the accounts I find close links to debates on
austerity urbanism, post-democracy and
gentrification. In a second step, I trace possi-
ble relations of these processes and the rise
of the far right. I do this by assessing them in
the light of long-term studies on right-wing
attitudes and the concept of ‘downward
mobility’. I will conclude with the hypothesis
that we are witnessing a shift from social to
regressive collectivity in German society (and
beyond).
Austerity urbanism, post-democracy and
gentrification
The loss of public infrastructure and a gen-
eral pullback of the welfare state are impor-
tant aspects in the interviews I conducted.
Such dynamics are neither unique nor new
to debates in urban studies. In fact, follow-
ing discussions on neoliberalising urban
spaces (cf. Belina et al., 2013; Brenner and
Theodore, 2002; Mullis, 2011), ‘austerity
urbanism’ has become an important issue. It
has been discussed as an elite-driven process
with the aim to push forward a neoliberal
restructuring of the social, economic and
political order (cf. Jones et al., 2016; Peck,
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2012; Scho¨nig and Schipper, 2016).
Austerity measures have dramatically
expanded economic logics to almost all parts
of society, along with what Harvey (2012:
53–57) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’
and what Sassen (2014: 12–79) describes as
‘expulsions’.
In Germany, austerity entered the consti-
tution in 2009 with the ‘balanced budget
amendment’. According to this law, the fed-
eral state is bound to restrict the structural
deficit to a maximum of 0.35% of GDP per
annum. The states are granted a period of
transition from 2016 to 2020 before struc-
tural deficits will be entirely forbidden
(Eicker-Wolf and Himpele, 2011: 199). But
municipalities had long before been sub-
jected to strict budget guidelines. Wiegand
(2016: 77) argues in line with Petzold (2018)
that the enforcement of municipal austerity
was not implemented as a ‘shock doctrine’,
but rather in a long-term process which has
extended over the last 30 to 40 years. In eco-
nomically weak regions, the changes were
applied without any democratic co-
determination and triggered a constant
downward spiral. With an eye to the case of
Frankfurt, it is striking that austerity also
impacts an economically strong city.
Uneven development emerges on a very
small scale here, it is in neighbourhoods
rather than the entire city ‘where austerity
bites’ (Peck, 2012: 629).
A second dominant narrative I encoun-
tered in the interviews concerns the loss of
opportunities for democratic participation.
While only a minority of residents partici-
pate in local initiatives, those who do so were
said to see themselves as largely ignored. In
urban studies, ‘post-democracy’ (Crouch,
2005; Rancie`re, 1999) has become the key-
word for discussing such processes (Mullis
and Schipper, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2011).
‘Post-democracy’ signifies a social order
that is strongly related to the neoliberal turn
of the late 1970s and the economisation of
both the political and the social. Although
democratic processes may remain in place or
even be increased through participation pro-
grammes, they are rendered meaningless by
shifting power relations and the re-scaling of
decision-making. Swyngedouw puts it like
this:
Agonistic debate is increasingly replaced by
disputes over the mobilization of a series of
new governmental technologies, managerial
dispositifs and institutional forms, articu-
lated around reflexive risk-calculation
(self-assessment), accountancy rules and
accountancy based disciplining, quantifica-
tion and benchmarking of performance.
‘Doing politics’ is reduced to a form of insti-
tutionalised social management, whereby
problems are dealt with through enrolling
managerial technologies and administrative
procedures. (Swyngedouw, 2011: 372)
International examples help to see that
experiences of post-democracy in Frankfurt
are linked to austerity urbanism. Jones et al.
(2016) stress that austerity heavily impacts
communities in deprived areas and decreases
their possibilities to participate both demo-
cratically and socially. Gest (2016) argues in
his analysis of two working-class neighbour-
hoods of East London that ‘civic circum-
stances’ are crucial for the existence (or lack)
of social organisation.
Whereas unions and other working-class
groups once overcame divisions to pursue pro-
fessional goals, the deterioration of these orga-
nisations and their manifestations in
workingman’s clubs, union halls, pubs and
clubhouses removed a venue for the develop-
ment of working class consciousness. (Gest,
2016: 139)
Mason (2017: 93) argues similarly when he
highlights that public-spending cuts in
England have led to the closing down of
community centres and have driven pubs
and clubs out of business because of the lack
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of customers. In total, all this results in the
loss of places where people can meet, where
collectivity is produced and a sense of
belonging can grow.
The third issue I wish to address, based
on the accounts provided in the interviews,
is gentrification (Lees et al., 2008) and its flip
side, exclusion (Kronauer, 2010; Wacquant,
2008). Since the financial crisis of 2007/2008,
Frankfurt’s housing market of mostly rental
apartments has undergone powerful pro-
cesses of gentrification (cf. Mo¨sgen and
Schipper, 2017; Schipper, 2013; Schipper
and Wiegand, 2015). Between 2006 and
2016, average market rents for apartments
rose by 41.4% and those for existing leases
by 24.9% (Stadt Frankfurt, 2018a: 42).
Since the late 2000s, gentrification in
Riederwald and Nied has created an explo-
sive situation. Both neighbourhoods still fea-
ture large housing estates. Around 10–20%
of all apartments are social housing there,
compared with a proportion of 0–5% in
Frankfurt’s downtown neighbourhoods (see
Figure 1). The lack of affordable housing in
Frankfurt has been exacerbated by the huge
drop in the total number of social housing
units – from around 70,000 in 1990 to 32,000
in 2016. In 2017, only 8.5% of Frankfurt’s
total rental stock is social housing (Stadt
Frankfurt, 2018a: 48) – even though already
in 2014, 49% of all tenant households were
entitled by income to social housing (IWU,
2015: 13). Hence, in 2017 nearly 10,000
households are on the waiting list for subsi-
dised apartments (Stadt Frankfurt, 2018a:
44). What is emerging is a ‘new housing
question’ (Scho¨nig, 2013).
What the examples from Riederwald and
Nied show is that a generalised process of
gentrification as it can be observed in the
centre of Frankfurt (see Figure 1) has differ-
ent impacts on neighbourhoods. In
Riederwald, the pressure of displacement is
growing in the area, the construction of the
new headquarters of the European Central
Bank especially has stimulated urban rede-
velopment in the entire east of Frankfurt
(Mo¨sgen and Schipper, 2017); whereas the
development in Nied is still rather marked
by the influx of less privileged people, who
are displaced from other parts of the city.
Both lead (along different paths) to uncer-
tainty and anger about the influx into the
neighbourhoods.
The rise of the far right
Now I will relate the sketched urban
dynamics – austerity urbanism, post-
democracy and gentrification – to findings
of the long-term studies on right-wing atti-
tudes as well as the concept of downward
mobility. As noted in the introduction, I do
not claim to give a final explanation but
wish to contribute to the debate on the rise
of the far right in an urban setting with
empirically grounded reflections.
To begin with, austerity urbanism high-
lights two distinct dimensions: first, the cases
of Riederwald and Nied suggest that the
pullback of the welfare state and the lack of
investment in social infrastructure have
increased feelings of being left behind and of
exclusion. Heitmeyer (2018: 124) argues that
even if no direct links to the rise of the far
right were to exist, such feelings create a fer-
tile ground. When they meet with other pat-
terns of prejudice, they increase the risk of
far-right articulations. A twofold mechanism
is at work: on the one hand, people aim to
regain status and certainty by devaluing the
alleged ‘other’ (cf. Charim, 2018); on the
other hand, strong leadership offered by the
far right allows projections of ‘hope’ to be
directed (Heitmeyer, 2018: 141). Second,
ideologies of neoliberal austerity intensify
what Zick et al. (2016: 21) call ‘economic
extremism’: neoliberal subjectification
strengthens economic assessments of sub-
jects which run along the line between ‘use-
ful’ and ‘useless’ (Zick et al., 2016: 177).
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Accordingly, when it comes to public spend-
ing and social welfare, distinctions are made
between subjects considered as worthy and
unworthy of gaining social benefits. People
considered less worthy are long-term unem-
ployed, migrants and asylum seekers, as well
as Sinti and Roma (Zick et al., 2019: 79–84).
For Fekete (2018: 5f), it is therefore clear
that contemporary austerity-driven govern-
ance has effected changes in the social struc-
ture and destroyed patterns of solidarity –
both of which offer fertile ground for the
rise of the far right.
Democracy’s credibility has likewise come
under pressure with this change in public
investment policies. While 92.8% of
Germans claimed they were in favour of
democracy, only 54.9% stated that they
were happy with the current order (Decker
and Bra¨hler, 2018: 96f). Many people feel
alienated, powerless and neglected by politi-
cal leaders: a good 70% of citizens in
Germany agree that ‘people like me’ have no
influence on government actions, and 58%
feel that it makes no sense to engage politi-
cally (Decker and Bra¨hler, 2018: 98). These
perceptions, as can be argued when consid-
ering the accounts made in the interviews on
Riederwald and Nied, do not come out of
the blue. They mirror real experiences peo-
ple have – or at least believe they have – in
their everyday lives. In general, Heitmeyer
(2018: 186–196) argues, such feelings appear
to have intensified through the various crises
since 2007/2008, first transforming fears into
silent refusal and then, combined with the
so-called refugee crisis in 2015, leading to
open anger. The AfD successfully collected
these feelings of political deprivation by pro-
mising a nationalist (basically racist) option
to regain political recognition.
Finally, concerning gentrification, the
housing question has historically been a fer-
tile ground for political mobilisation also
from the right. In the 1920s and 1930s, the
shortage of affordable housing in German
cities was used by the Nazis to propose a dif-
ferentiation between Germans, who were
seen as entitled, and the ‘others’, who were
to give way (Bernet et al., 2019: 14). Housing
is a crucial resource for this instrumental
construction of entitlements, and it has been
used by the far right repeatedly: in his analy-
ses of The Republicans, Jaschke (1993: 129–
136) emphasises that changes in urban every-
day life, isolation and fragmentation influ-
enced people to vote for the party. A
comparative study in seven European coun-
tries on the relationship between right-wing
attitudes and socio-economic change shows
that the new housing question is an impor-
tant issue and fosters right-wing attitudes
(SIREN, 2006: 68f). In the same vein,
U¨blacker and Lukas (2019: 107) have
recently related gentrification to the rise of
the far right in Du¨sseldorf, Germany. They
show that in exposed neighbourhoods 40%
fear their own displacement (27% in the city
overall) and even 68% are afraid of rent
increases (compared with 41% overall). The
authors recognise a window of opportunity
for right-wing ‘political actors who address
these fears’ (U¨blacker and Lukas, 2019:
113).
At the same time, under the current con-
ditions of social polarisation the influx of
newcomers creates feelings of being left
behind and of the elites not caring about ‘the
established’ and therefore more entitled citi-
zens. Gest (2016: 16) highlights for the case
of East London that ‘many white working-
class people feel like the victims of discrimi-
nation’. Unlike migrants, they feel they have
less access to social housing, welfare pro-
grammes and education – although they may
in fact not be disadvantaged at all. He shows
that economic deprivation in marginalised
neighbourhoods impacts people equally, and
that especially young white men turn to the
far right if they view themselves as being
attacked and collectively reduced (Gest,
2016: 178f). This fits with the finding that
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37.7% of Germans held the opinion that
people who have lived in the country longer
should have more rights than newcomers
(Zick et al., 2019: 84). Accordingly, as Hillje
(2018: 9) shows, group-focused enmity tends
to be politically articulated in the context of
growing conflicts over the allocation of
social benefits and diminishing possibilities
of participating socially.
Regarding the accounts on Riederwald
and Nied, it can be suggested that gentrifica-
tion and exclusion from social interaction in
these neighbourhoods contributes to dis-
mantling a sense of community.
Gentrification impacts the way in which
society is locally perceived. Newman et al.
(2012) underscore that the pace of socio-
demographic change is a key determinant
for intolerance. Accordingly, gentrification
in the context of the emerging new housing
question can stimulate prejudice and far-
right attitudes, especially in a city such as
Frankfurt, where urban renewal and gentri-
fication have not only been high on the city
council’s agenda of urban development and
global city formation for the past 30 years
(Schipper, 2014) but where the pace of gen-
trification is also high.
From social to regressive collectivity
My empirical research in Frankfurt suggests
that expanding ‘authoritarian capitalism’
(Heitmeyer, 2018: 30, 118), social disintegra-
tion and the decline of democracy have polit-
ical effects and are articulated in right-wing
attitudes. However, the question of why this
is the case remains unanswered, as the core
shift from social to regressive modernity
(Nachtwey, 2016) actually affects society in
total. Eribon (2013) makes an important
observation in this regard. He emphasises
that although racism was present where he
lived as a child, everyone voted for the
French communist party. Racism was not
the unifying topic; the dominant social cate-
gory for producing collectivity was class:
‘The claim could be made that voting com-
munist represented a positive form of self-
affirmation, whereas voting Front National
[today] represented a negative one’ (Eribon,
2013: 133).
Following this I argue that advanced
capitalist societies are undergoing a funda-
mental transformation in the way collectiv-
ity comes to be possible and that we are
witnessing what I identify, with reference to
Nachtwey (2016), as a transition from social
to regressive collectivity. What seems to
emerge is a type of collectivity that is largely
produced through negative emotions such
as prejudice, political impotence, loss of
status and even racism, misogyny and anti-
semitism. The collective experience of being
alone is not articulated collectively but
alone. There is a collective experience at
work, but this does not transform into soli-
darity but remains in singular voices. This
type of collectivity invites far-right politics,
which offers forms of belonging to a collec-
tive without everyday social bonds, such as
nationalism, chauvinism and ideologies of
inequality and division.
However, the transformations described
not only stimulate far-right politics but also
largely eliminate opportunities to develop
collectivity based on solidarity. In their basic
terms, they undermine ideals of human
rights, equality and collective emancipation.
Significantly, while patterns of regressive
collectivity may affect and can actually be
detected in all of society, regressive collectiv-
ity is not a class-neutral phenomenon. It
mostly unleashes its devastating power in
the less privileged strata of society.
Conclusion
In this article, based on ethnographic
research in two neighbourhoods of
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Frankfurt, I have traced processes of auster-
ity urbanism, post-democracy as well as gen-
trification. The accounts in the interviews
indicated that these processes have a tangi-
ble effect on everyday life and social reality
in these neighbourhoods. In a second step, I
have related these accounts to debates on
the rise of the far right. I suggest that auster-
ity may foster feelings of downward mobility
by increasing social division and an
increased competition over resources. Post-
democracy intensifies the sense of impotence
and of having no voice. Gentrification under
the conditions of the new housing question
furthermore increases economic worries,
damages social cohesion and may also pro-
duce hostile feelings towards migrants.
Together, these processes can be understood
as important catalysts for far-right attitudes.
However, as the discussed processes are
nearly equally tangible for all the residents
in the neighbourhoods, no direct link can be
drawn to the rise of the far right; other
political responses such as migrant solidarity
networks, tenant organisations or local
democracy committees can also be found.
Still, the rise of the far right is a reality also
in these neighbourhoods, and is linked to
the urban experience. It has to be acknowl-
edged that urban everyday life not only sub-
jectivises in progressive ways and intensifies
a generalised struggle over the right to the
city (Harvey, 2012; Lefebvre, 1968; Mayer,
2009; Mullis, 2014, 2017), but also produces
regressive answers to current tensions
in society. I therefore suggest a further
engagement with the links between urban
processes and the production of far-right
attitudes. I believe that the mechanisms of
post-democratic urban politics, gentrifica-
tion and austerity have to be analysed in
their interdependence to better understand
contemporary modes of political subjectifi-
cation (cf. Mullis and Zschocke, 2019). This
must include a reflection on class divisions,
racism as well as the transition from social
to regressive collectivity. This would serve
not only to enable a better understanding of
current political developments, but also to
give political answers to the rise of the far
right.
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